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ABSTRACT
Essays on Bank Optimal Portfolio Choice under Liquidity Constraint.
(August 2012)
Eul Jin Kim, B.A., Seoul National University
Co–Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Hwagyun Kim
Dr. Ryo Jinnai
Long term asset creates more revenue, however it is riskier in a liquidity sense. Our
question is: How does a liquidity constrained bank make decisions between profitabil-
ity and liquidity? We present a computable DSGE model of banks optimal portfolio
choices under liquidity constraints. Our theory predicts that liquidation plays an im-
portant role in a bank’s portfolio model. Even though liquidation is an off-equilibrium
phenomenon, banks can have rich loan portfolios due to the possibility of liquidation.
Liquidity condition is a key factor in banks portfolio. In a moderate liquidity sit-
uation, a bank can lend more profitable longer term loans, however, if a shock in
liquidity is expected, then the bank lends more loans in short term. According to the
liquidity conditions, the bank can have medium term loans which is different from
other previous literature.
In addition, we extend our model to the bank’s securities business where the
bank’s debts are largely short term deposit. Our theory predicts that the bank se-
curities business produces a chasm between a real liquidity of economy and market
liquidity. Banks can have more liquidity by selling their securitized loans, and as
our model already pointed out, a good liquidity condition makes the bank have more
profitable but less liquid long term loans. As a consequence, long term loans are
accumulated with this securitization, simply because a long term loan gives higher
revenue. Any market turbulence can invoke a problem in economy wide liquidity.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Banks finance short-term from the public and invest to project holders considerably
long-term. The miss-match of maturities between banks liabilities and assets is a
good topic of many researchers and also a real problem of bank managers. Although
a bank should be ready to pay her debts without any prior notice, she can have long-
term assets in that, first, she has ’the law of large numbers’ and, second, she can
make new debts as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argued. Banks can make estima-
tions of cash-in and -out flows due to their long experiences and/or well established
statistical methods. This is ’the law’, the well known and easy to understand. How-
ever, it is not quite simple to catch the meaning of the argument, when they said
that making new debts to pay old debts is one of key functions of banking business.
Anybody having a highly profitable and strongly promissible project can find lenders
to invest, if she has proper creditworthiness. Banks concern their reputations with
the same reason. They explained that, since the bank has a specialized skill to find
where the profitable projects are, and who owns, and since the bank always tries
to keep good records to survive, a new debt to the bank means that the economy
does not lose a new profit opportunity. Therefore making new debts to pay old debts
means the economy can enjoy more fruits from longer term projects. This can be
accomplished the most efficiently only by the bank. Their arguments, and Diamond
and Rajan (2001) analogous extension provide a rich insightfulness to understand the
core aspects of banking business. Banks make liquid deposits with illiquid loans, and
This dissertation follows the style of Econometrica.
2therefore profits are made and distributed from borrowers to lenders.
Now, more practical problems of ’how much’ and ’how long’ need to be answered.
There are two strands of literature, bank portfolio and loan maturity. First, a strong
tradition leans on the linear programming, such as asset and liability management
(ALM) and bond portfolio management literatures. ALM models deal with cash flow,
liquidity, risk and return of bank’s assets and liabilities. Based on Markowitz (1959)
portfolio selection theory, Pyle (1971) provided a static model, and Kallberg and
Ziemba (1983) extended to a dynamic model. Another ALM approach using stochas-
tic dynamic programming is found by Eppen and Fama (1968, 1969, 1971), and Kusy
and Ziemba (1986). ALM model was once so popular, but basically too technical and
lacks microfoundations. A bond portfolio model handles banks assets and liabilities
management. Crane (1971) constructed a discrete stochastic multi-stage model and
found that optimal portfolio is one of (1) shortest only, (2) longest only or (3) mix
of the two, so medium term bonds cannot be an optimal. Furfine (2001) analyzed
the bank portfolio changes according to the Basel Capital Accord. He found that
banking regulation encourages banks to shift from loans to safer assets. Second, loan
maturity problem is handled by Coleman, Esho, and Sharpe (2002), Gottesman and
Roberts (2004) and Fedorenko, Schafer, and Talavera (2007). Coleman, Esho, and
Sharpe (2002) argued that bank monitoring ability, bargaining power, risk and syn-
dicate structure significantly affect the loan maturity and pricing. Gottesman and
Roberts (2004) found evidences supporting both the tradeoff, which is lenders are
compensated for longer maturity loans, and the credit quality hypotheses, that is
lenders limit their exposure by forcing riskier borrowers to take short term loans.
Fedorenko, Schafer, and Talavera (2007) established an empirical model of Diamond
(1991), and found (1) the best and the worst rated loans tend to have shorter ma-
turities than loans with an intermediate rating (consistent with Diamond), and (2) a
3negative association between ratings and the maturity of the loans to sole proprietors
(differ from Diamond and other empirical literature).
We provide a model to handle directly a liquidity constrained bank’s optimal
loan portfolio choice, and this is the first DSGE approach dealing with this problem,
as far as we know. We borrow major concepts from the Diamond and Rajan (2001)
paper: relationship lending, specialized skills in loan collection, renegotiation, and
liquidation process. In addition, we introduce an incentive constraint scheme against
bank runs, assumptions on investment- and production-technologies to standardize
loan contracts. As a result, we have effectively established a DSGE model with infinite
horizon and multiple loans.
The incentive constraint makes the bank solvent with the demand deposits at any
time and states, so the bank creates new liquidity. This constraint can rule out the
bank run in equilibrium path, however, it causes the bank not to avoid their due dili-
gence. Therefore there is no financial frictions of information asymmetry, and moral
hazards. For the standardization, we allow arbitrage between projects with different
technologies. For instance, a less profitable long term project will be dominated by
more profitable short term projects. More technically, we assume an efficient invest-
ment interval of technology, which can be thought of as a minimized input for the
same output. With these two moderate assumptions, we got a simple function rep-
resentation of bank’s loan portfolio on R+ × [0, 1] plane. The computational burden
dramatically reduced.
Our theory predicts that liquidation plays an important role in the bank’s portfo-
lio model. Even though liquidation is an off-equilibrium phenomenon, banks can have
rich loan portfolio due to the possibility of liquidation. Liquidity condition is a key
factor in banks portfolio. In a moderate situation, a bank can lend more profitable
longer term loans, however, if a shock in liquidity is expected, then the bank lends
4more loans in short term. According to the liquidity conditions, the bank can have
medium term loans which is different from Crane (1971).
Banking business is quite different from their traditional aspects. They have
many securities and trading assets in their balance sheets. Without the securitization,
we could not explain nowadays banking business properly. Securitization in banking
business makes better off our economy in good seasons definitely. However, with
the depressed securities market, banks can deepen the business cycles. Bank’s debts
are largely short term deposit. Our theory predicts that the bank securities business
produces a chasm between a real liquidity of economy and market liquidity. Banks can
have more liquidity by selling their securitized loans, and as our model already pointed
out, a good liquidity condition makes the bank more profitable but less liquid long
term loans. As a consequence, long term loans are accumulated and every participant
is happy with this securitization, simply because a long term loan gives higher revenue.
However, the economy has less liquidity in short term. Any market turbulence can
invoke a problem in economy wide liquidity.
As Rajan (2006) pointed out, banking business has changed to more risky areas,
due to technical change, deregulation and institutional change. Banks improve their
risk management abilities and risk taking capacities. This trend is an inevitable
consequence of severe competitions. The above three factors have pushed up the
banks for more profitability to survive. Banks have to involve in high profit business
like securities, derivatives and exotic new financial products. Banking business is quite
different from their traditional aspects. They have many securities and trading assets
in their balance sheets. Without the securitization, we could not explain nowadays
banking business properly. Securitization in banking business makes better off our
economy in good seasons definitely. However, with the depressed securities market,
banks can deepen the business cycles. Banks’ debts are largely short term deposit.
5Many literatures analyze the securities business in banking, however, very few directly
connecting the securities to the bank’s short term liabilities. We provide a useful tool
to analyze bank’s traditional loan and deposit business connected with new securities
business.
Recent sub-prime mortgage crisis is believed that banks misalignments of re-
sources is a main cause. There are many literatures analyzing this crisis with finan-
cial frictions(Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2010)). Our model provides why banks
should involve in securities business, and how crisis evolves inherently in the bank’s
securities business.
Our theory predicts that the bank securities business makes a chasm between
a real liquidity of economy and market liquidity. Banks can have more liquidity by
selling their securitized loans, and as our previous model already pointed out, a good
liquidity condition push the bank more profitable but less liquid long term loans. As
a consequence, long-term loans are accumulated, and every participant happy with
this securitization, simply because long term loan gives higher revenue. However,
the economy has less liquidity in short term. Any market turbulence can invoke a
problem in economy wide liquidity. Therefore bank regulators and macroeconomic
policy agencies should make a brake to the securities business of banks. We suppose
a liquidity taxation in banks’ securities business as a provision for the shortage of
liquidity and government direct money injections to the market as a crisis response.
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BANK OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO CHOICE UNDER LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINT
A. Introduction
Banks finance short-term from the public and invest to project holders considerably
long-term. The miss-match of maturities between banks liabilities and assets is a
good topic of many researchers and also a real problem of bank managers. Although
a bank should be ready to pay her debts without any prior notice, she can have long-
term assets in that, first, she has ’the law of large numbers’ and, second, she can
make new debts as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argued. Banks can make estima-
tions of cash-in and -out flows due to their long experiences and/or well established
statistical methods. This is ’the law’, the well known and easy to understand. How-
ever, it is not quite simple to catch the meaning of the argument, when they said
that making new debts to pay old debts is one of key functions of banking business.
Anybody having a highly profitable and strongly promissible project can find lenders
to invest, if she has proper creditworthiness. Banks concern their reputations with
the same reason. They explained that, since the bank has a specialized skill to find
where the profitable projects are, and who owns, and since the bank always tries
to keep good records to survive, a new debt to the bank means that the economy
does not lose a new profit opportunity. Therefore making new debts to pay old debts
means the economy can enjoy more fruits from longer term projects. This can be
accomplished the most efficiently only by the bank. Their arguments, and Diamond
and Rajan (2001) analogous extension provide a rich insightfulness to understand the
core aspects of banking business. Banks make liquid deposits with illiquid loans, and
therefore profits are made and distributed from borrowers to lenders.
7Now, more practical problems of ’how much’ and ’how long’ need to be answered.
There are two strands of literature, bank portfolio and loan maturity. First, a strong
tradition leans on the linear programming, such as asset and liability management
(ALM) and bond portfolio management literatures. ALM models deal with cash flow,
liquidity, risk and return of bank’s assets and liabilities. Based on Markowitz (1959)
portfolio selection theory, Pyle (1971) provided a static model, and Kallberg and
Ziemba (1983) extended to a dynamic model. Another ALM approach using stochas-
tic dynamic programming is found by Eppen and Fama (1968, 1969, 1971), and Kusy
and Ziemba (1986). ALM model was once so popular, but basically too technical and
lacks microfoundations. A bond portfolio model handles banks assets and liabilities
management. Crane (1971) constructed a discrete stochastic multi-stage model and
found that optimal portfolio is one of (1) shortest only, (2) longest only or (3) mix
of the two, so medium term bonds cannot be an optimal. Furfine (2001) analyzed
the bank portfolio changes according to the Basel Capital Accord. He found that
banking regulation encourages banks to shift from loans to safer assets. Second, loan
maturity problem is handled by Coleman, Esho, and Sharpe (2002), Gottesman and
Roberts (2004) and Fedorenko, Schafer, and Talavera (2007). Coleman, Esho, and
Sharpe (2002) argued that bank monitoring ability, bargaining power, risk and syn-
dicate structure significantly affect the loan maturity and pricing. Gottesman and
Roberts (2004) found evidences supporting both the tradeoff, which is lenders are
compensated for longer maturity loans, and the credit quality hypotheses, that is
lenders limit their exposure by forcing riskier borrowers to take short term loans.
Fedorenko, Schafer, and Talavera (2007) established an empirical model of Diamond
(1991), and found (1) the best and the worst rated loans tend to have shorter ma-
turities than loans with an intermediate rating (consistent with Diamond), and (2) a
negative association between ratings and the maturity of the loans to sole proprietors
8(differ from Diamond and other empirical literature).
We provide a model to handle directly a liquidity constrained bank’s optimal
loan portfolio choice, and this is the first DSGE approach dealing with this problem,
as far as we know. We borrow major concepts from the Diamond and Rajan (2001)
paper: relationship lending, specialized skills in loan collection, renegotiation, and
liquidation process. In addition, we introduce an incentive constraint scheme against
bank runs, assumptions on investment- and production-technologies to standardize
loan contracts. As a result, we have effectively established a DSGE model with infinite
horizon and multiple loans.
The incentive constraint makes the bank solvent with the demand deposits at any
time and states, so the bank creates new liquidity. This constraint can rule out the
bank run in equilibrium path, however, it causes the bank not to avoid their due dili-
gence. Therefore there is no financial frictions of information asymmetry, and moral
hazards. For the standardization, we allow arbitrage between projects with different
technologies. For instance, a less profitable long term project will be dominated by
more profitable short term projects. More technically, we assume an efficient invest-
ment interval of technology, which can be thought of as a minimized input for the
same output. With these two moderate assumptions, we got a simple function rep-
resentation of bank’s loan portfolio on R+ × [0, 1] plane. The computational burden
dramatically reduced.
Our theory predicts that liquidation plays an important role in the bank’s portfo-
lio model. Even though liquidation is an off-equilibrium phenomenon, banks can have
rich loan portfolio due to the possibility of liquidation. Liquidity condition is a key
factor in banks portfolio. In a moderate situation, a bank can lend more profitable
longer term loans, however, if a shock in liquidity is expected, then the bank lends
more loans in short term. According to the liquidity conditions, the bank can have
9medium term loans which is different from Crane (1971).
The next section describes model features. Section C gives us some characteriza-
tions and the simple function representation, and the following section presents some
calibration strategies, summary of the results. Then we conclude.
B. Model
1. Environment
The model exists on the discrete and infinite time space. There are three aggregate
shocks: a total factor productivity (TFP) shock, At ∈ A ≡ {A1, A2, · · · , Al}, and two
shocks that determine the distribution of capital quality φt ∈ Φ ≡ {φ1, φ2, · · · , φm},
and that of time preference gt ∈ G ≡ {g1, g2, · · · , gn}. (At, φt, gt) are mutually in-
dependent, and form a joint Markov process that evolves according to a transition
probability Γ : (A× Φ × G) × (A× Φ × G) → [0, 1] with the standard assumptions.
There exist two goods: a perishable consumption (final) goods and a capital goods.
a. Agents
There are three types of agents: producers (final goods producers and a representa-
tive capital goods producer), households and a representative bank. Producers are
members of one big family. They share all earnings, and eat completely the whole
profits at the time they earn. Since they are assumed to have no capitals, they should
borrow from the banker to run their businesses. Households supply labor services to
the producers inelastically, and they have some initial endowments. They can con-
sume and save the labor income. Since the banker has her own specialized skills in
relationship lending and loan collection, she can efficiently intermediate between the
borrowers and the savers.
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b. Capital Quality, Capital Unit and Project (or Capital)
We introduce a capital unit k with its quality ω, according to Bigio (2011). At each
time period, capital K held by the final goods producer is divisible into a continuum of
units, and each unit is identified by its quality ω ∈ Ω ≡ [0, 1]. We call an integrated
mass of the capital units a project or a capital, Kω0t =
∫ ω0
0
kt(ω)dω, ω0 ∈ Ω. The
capital cannot be directly inputted into a production process without a capital quality
adjustment shock fφt(ω) at each period. So, the multiplicative shock fφt(ω) which
determined by the realization of φt, can be regarded as a homogenizing process of the
different quality capital units. In addition, there is a fixed increasing differentiable
function λ(ω) : [0, 1] → [0, 1], which can be interpreted as a residual proportion of
capital unit after production (one minus depreciation rate). By the definition of λ(ω),
we can understand the capital quality ω more clearly. Durable capital units such as
machines, buildings have high capital quality, while parts, components, and fuel have
′0′ or low quality. Therefore, we can assume that each project is a mass of capital
units on the interval of capital quality Ω, starting from zero [0, ω0].
c. Investment Technology and Production Periods
The investment technology transforms the consumption goods into the following pe-
riod capital goods. For the transformation cost, there is a fixed increasing differen-
tiable function qt(ω) of capital quality, and the cost is Q
ω0
t =
∫ ω0
0
qt(ω)dω, ω0 ∈ Ω.
Therefore to install a project of Kω0t amount, the producer needs It = Q
ω0
t K
ω0
t amount
of consumption goods investment. We assume that the capital goods are produced
with a rectangular shape on the domain of capital quality Ω. This assumption is
not critical to our model results if the shape can be represented by any functional
forms, but it can make the model developments easy. We suppose the final pro-
11
ducer invests It at time t. At the beginning of time t + 1, she owns K
ω0
t =
It
Q
ω0
t
≡∫ ω0
0
kt(ω0)dω, kt(ω0) ∈ R+ amount of capital. After the distributional adjustment
shock, the amount of Kt =
∫ ω0
0
fφt(ω)kt(ω0)dω capital is in use in production process.
Noticed that the superscript ω0 doesn’t be used in Kt after the adjustment shock.
After the production process, the capital discomposes into each capital unit, and the
remains be Kω0t =
∫ ω0
0
fφt(ω)λ(ω)kt(ω0)dω. And we define the number of production
periods any project or capital can be engaged in as follows,
Definition II.1. Any project has a production periods N(ω0, η, φt) ≥ 0 such that
N(ω0, η, φt) = arg maxn{
∫ ω0
0
Eφt [
n∏
k=1
fφt+k(ω)]λ(ω)
nkt+1(ω0)dω > η,
where
∫ ω0
0
kt+1(ω0)dω = 1, η < 1}, where Eφt [fφt+1(ω)fφt+2(ω)] =
∑
φi,φj∈Φ fφj(ω)P(φj |
φi)fφi(ω)P(φi | φt)..
The definition means that after some number of production periods the remain-
ing capital should exceed a minimum amount of capital η given a unit of capital
investment, to be engaged in the following period’s production process. Since the pe-
riods depend on the interval of capital quality [0, ω0], and given information η and φt,
we can fix the periods of a project at the time of investment. The project with high
quality has longer production periods by the definition. Moreover, we denote an inter-
val of capital qualities with same production periods ωt(n) = {ω : N(ω0, η, φt) = n},
and denote the element of the interval ωnt ∈ ωt(n).
d. Production Technology and Project Arbitrage
The final goods are produced by the following production technology,
Yt = AtK
α
t , 0 < α < 1,
12
and assume as usual that producers get the proportion α of the output, and the
others (1−α) goes to the labor income. Then the steam of producers’ expected total
revenues will be
(Rt+1, · · · , Rt+n) = {αEAt(At+j)
∫ ωnt
0
Eφt [
j∏
k=1
fφt+k(ω)]λ(ω)
j−1kt+1(ωnt )dω}nj=1,
where EAt(At+2) =
∑
Ai,Aj∈AAiP(Ai | Aj)P(Aj | At).
We assume that the expected revenues are decreasing as capital depreciates,
Rt+1 ≥ Rt+2 ≥ · · · ≥ Rt+n, and it is not natural that bigger output can be expected
with quite smaller capital input. Then we can consider the arbitrage between projects.
Let’s suppose we can have two different projects K
ωmt
t+1, K
ωnt
t+1, with the same amount
of consumption goods investment. We allow that the inferior projects are wiped out
by the superior projects with respect to the efficiencies of investment and production
technology. The arbitrage conditions are as follows, (1) Without loss of generality
m ≤ n, for each period before short term project matures the bigger revenue produc-
ing project dominates the smaller revenue producing project. Formally if ∀k ≤ m,
R
ωmt
t+k ≥ Rω
n
t
t+k, project K
ωmt
t+1 dominates project K
ωnt
t+1, and if
∀k ≤ m, Rωmtt+k ≤ Rω
n
t
t+k,
project K
ωmt
t+1 is dominated by project K
ωnt
t+1. (2) Without loss of generality m ≤ n,
if a project producing the bigger discounted sum of revenues upto the short term
project maturity dominates the other project producing the smaller discounted sum
of revenues. Formally, if
∑m
k Λ
kR
ωmt
t+k ≥
∑m
k Λ
kR
ωnt
t+k, then project K
ωmt
t+1 dominates
project K
ωnt
t+1, and if
∑m
k Λ
kR
ωmt
t+k ≤
∑m
k Λ
kR
ωnt
t+k, then project K
ωmt
t+1 is dominated by
project K
ωnt
t+1, where Λ is a proper discount rate. After the arbitrages in projects,
survival projects should have the following properties, (1) the shorter project must
have higher liquidity than longer project, (2) the longer project must have bigger
profits than the shorter project. We formally assume the properties,
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Assumption II.2. The parameter At, functions fφt(ω), λ(ω), q(ω) and transition
probability Γ are well arranged, so that
(a) ∀t,∀At × φt ∈ (A× Φ), Rt+1 ≥ Rt+2 ≥ · · · ≥ Rt+n, and
(b) there exists a sufficient number of projects after the project arbitrages.
e. Loan Contract and Liquidation
Our loan markets are designed following the Diamond and Rajan (2001). A rela-
tionship lender knows where the best and the alternative technology locate in, and
there will be renegotiation process after the states realizes. If the banker refuses the
producer’s offer, liquidation will take place. Our model has a big difference in that
the loan contracts involve loan repayment schedules, since our focus is on the different
maturity loan contracts and their liquidity effects. We assume that the number ′n′
is sufficiently large so that we can analyze a bank’s loan portfolio. Loan contracts
can be characterized by the following quadruple (a
(n)
t+1, n, {Pt+j}nj=1, {mt+j}nj=1),where
a
(n)
t+1 indicates the amount of loan made at time t, n the maturity of the loan, Pt+j the
promised amount of repayment at time t+ j, mt+j the liquidation value from the re-
maining capitals at the beginning of time t+j. We suppose that the banker’s collecting
skill be represented by a parameter γ. Then
Pt+j = γαEAt(At+j){
∫ ωnt
0
Eφt [
j∏
i=1
fφt+i(ω)]λ(ω)
j−1kt+1(ωnt )dω}α,
mt+j = γ
∫ ωnt
0
Eφt [
j∏
i=1
fφt+i(ω)]λ(ω)
j−1kt+1(ωnt )dω,
where
∫ ωnt
0
qt(ω)dω
∫ ωnt
0
kt+1(ω
n
t )dω = a
(n)
t+1. If the banker accepts the renegotiation
offer from the producer, the banker gets a real delivery
rt+j = γαAt+j{
∫ ωnt
0
[
j∏
i=1
fφt+i(ω)]λ(ω)
j−1kt+1(ωnt )dω}α.
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Therefore, the necessary conditions for loan liquidation is (1) the realized revenue is
smaller than the promised repayment, rt+k < Pt+k, (2) the liquidation value is bigger
than the current period’s revenue, mt+k > rt+k. Denote a
(j,n)
t+1 , 0 ≤ j ≤ n, a loan
contract liquidated at time t + j with maturity n,and j = 0 denotes no liquidation
of the contract. Then we can describe the liquidation possible area. Denote U (j,·) ≡
A×Φj, and Ψ(j,n)t+1 ≡ {ψ(j,n)t+1 ∈ U (j,·) : rt+j < Pt+j, and rt+j < mt+j, given a(j,n)t+1 , At, φt}.
And note P(Ψ(j,n)t+1 ) the probability of the liquidation possibility area.
f. Efficient Interval of Capital Quality
Given the states At, φt, and the amount of loan (a
(·,n)
t+1 ) with loan maturity n, there
exists a unique capital quality interval [0, ω
(·,n)∗
t+1 ], ω
(·,n)∗
t+1 ∈ ωt+1(n) to achieve the
maximum output, and we define the optimal interval [0, ω
(·,n)∗
t+1 ] which ensures the
efficient investment.
ω
(·,n)∗
t+1 = arg max
ωnt+1∈ωt+1(n)
[
n∑
i=1
EAt(At+i){
∫ ωnt+1
0
Eφt [
i∏
h=1
fφt+h(ω)]λ(ω)
i−1kt+1(ωnt+1)dω}α,
where
∫ ωnt+1
0
qt(ω)dω
∫ ωnt+1
0
kt+1(ω
n
t+1)dω = a
(·,n)
t+1 .
We extend this efficient investment interval to a loan with liquidation plan a
(j,n)
t+1 .
We define the efficient interval of capital quality, given the states At, φt, and a unit
amount of loan (a
(j,n)
t+1 = 1) with loan maturity n, and liquidation plan j. If we define
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ωt+1(j, n)
∗ = [0, ω(j,n)∗t+1 ], then ω
(j,n)∗
t+1
= arg max
ωnt+1∈ωt+1(n)
[
j−1∑
i=1
EAt(At+i){
∫ ωnt+1
0
Eφt [
i∏
h=1
fφt+h(ω)]λ(ω)
i−1kt+1(ωnt+1)dω}α
+P(Ψ(j,n)t+1 )
∫ ωnt+1
0
qt(ω)dω
∫ ωnt+1
0
Eφt [
j∏
i=1
fφt+i(ω)]λ(ω)
j−1kt+1(ωnt+1)dω
+(1− P(Ψ(j,n)t+1 ))
n∑
i=j
EAt(At+i){
∫ ωnt+1
0
Eφt [
i∏
h=1
fφt+h(ω)]λ(ω)
i−1kt+1(ωnt+1)dω}α],
where
∫ ωnt+1
0
qt(ω)dω
∫ ωnt+1
0
kt+1(ω
n
t+1)dω = 1.
Since the interval ωt+1(j, n)
∗ has nothing to do with the banker’s discount rate,
the optimal interval of the banker can be different form this interval ωt+1(j, n)
∗.
However, the interval is decided by the production level efficiency. We assume that
the real investment takes place only in the set of efficient intervals {ωt+1(j, n)∗}, and
so does the bank loans. And noticed that ωt+1(j, n)
∗ depends only on (At, φt).
g. Deposit Contract and Incentive Constraint
Households makes deposits dt+1 with gross interest rate r
d
t+1 > 1 at time t, only when
the bank is believed to be solvent at time t + 1. Therefore, we impose a incentive
constraint such that (1) if the bank (we assume the bank is risk-averse expected utility
maximizer.) solves her optimization problem with the following liquidity condition,
(2) the bank can take deposits from households. The condition is that
for all time and states,
deposit repayment < revenues from assets + new deposit taking.
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h. Producers’ Problems
According to the Diamond and Rajan (2001), producers have their own technology-
specific skills, and they can enjoy rents from those technologies if any. They have
no endowed capital, and no storage technology. Suppose that the capital goods pro-
ducer transforms the consumption goods to capital goods with the capital quality
dependent costs Qω0t =
∫ ω0
0
qt(ω)dω, ω0 ∈ Ω. There will be no profits in the capital
goods production. We assume that the capital goods producer can access unlimit-
edly to intra-period bank loan with gross interest rate ′1′, and there is no problem
for the banker to pay back the loan. A unit mass of final goods producers draw
z ∈ [0, 1] at every period, and the skills can handle the capital goods with quality
[0, z] are endowed to the producer z. Since they take part in the production process
only with bank loan, they accept inelastically the bank’s lending offer. Therefore
there is nothing to optimize in producers’ problems.
i. Households Problems
A unit mass of households are identified with a number h ∈ [β, β]. The household h
gets time preference F (h) at each period as following,
Ft(h) =
∫ h
β
fgt(β)dβ
Each household maximizes the expected utilities over the consumption streams,
E[
∞∑
t=0
βt log(ct)]
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Household’s problem is,
Vt(dt) = max
dt+1
log(ct(st)) + βtE[Vt+1(dt+1(st+1))]
s.t.∀t, et(st) + rdt (st)dt(st) ≥ ct(st) + dt+1(st+1),
positivities, e0 given, and take r
d
t as given,
where st ∈ S ≡ A×Φ×G is the aggregate state. The total labor income (1−α)Yt(st)
is equally distributed to each personal et(st), so that (1− α)Yt(st) =
∫
h
et(st)dh.
j. Bank Problem
For the incentive constraint to work, we assume that the banker is a expected utility
maximizer, and the form is a log function. Then by the strict positivity condition of
each period consumption, the incentive constraint is automatically met.
E[
∞∑
t=0
βb log(ct)]
where βb is the time preference of the banker. The banker sets the deposit interest
rate rd competitively, and makes loans with ′n′ number of different maturities to the
final producers. The banker should decide whether to liquidate or not against the
existing loans, if the borrower requests renegotiation. The banker’s revenue from loan
contract will be min{Pt+j, rt+j} if the contract not liquidated. If she does, she can get
mt+j. Therefore the banker problem contains lots of choice variables, and it extends
to the ′n′ period problem.
Before the exact and complicate algebra comes, we present the banker’s problem
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briefly,
Vt(Statest) = max
lt
{ max
at+1,rdt+1
log(ct(st)) + β
bEVt+1(Statest+1)}
s.t.∀t, ct(st) = revenues
(l1t )
t (st) + revenues
(l0t )
t (st)− new loant+1(st+1)
+Dt+1(st+1)− rdtDt(st),
∀t,∀ st, ct(st) > 0,
{ωt+1(j, n) :
∫ ω(j,n)t+1
0
qt(ω)dω
∫ ω(j,n)t+1
0
kt+1(ω
(j,n)
t+1 )dω = a
(j,n)
t+1 } ⊂ {ωt+1(j, n)∗},
rdt+1 > 1 and take Dt+1 as given
where, Statest contains the past loan portfolios Lt, deposit Dt and liquidation his-
tories Ht−1, and formally (L
Ht−1
t , Dt), L
Ht−1
t denotes the portfolios with liquidation
histories. Revenues
(l1t )
t is total revenues from the past portfolios which is not liqui-
dated at time t, formally, 1′n(Rt(st)◦Ht−1 ◦ lt)1n, the matrices will be explained soon,
revenues
(l0t )
t total revenues from liquidated portfolio, formally 1
′
n(Mt(st)◦(1−lt)◦T )1n,
and new loant+1 formally 1
′
nat+1(st+1), where ◦ denotes elementwise multiplication in
vector space. And ∀st+1, Dt+1(st+1) =
∫
β
fgt+1(β)dt+1(st+1)dβ. We impose the efficient
investment interval condition as a constraint.
Notations, first, should be considered,
Notation II.3. 1n = (1, 1, · · · , 1)′ denote one vector size n, and assume that n ∈ N
is sufficiently large.
T is lower triangular matrix which has ′1′ for each nonzero element.
a
(n)
t+1 ∈ R+ denotes the loan amounts with maturity ′n′.
at+1 = (a
(1)
t+1, · · · , a(n)t+1)′ ∈ Rn+ denotes a loan vector.
Lt = (at, at−1, · · · , at−n+1)◦T ∈ Rn+×Rn+ denotes a loan matrix which was made
from time t− n.
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ex) Lt =

a
(1)
t 0 0 · 0
a
(2)
t a
(2)
t−1 0 · 0
a
(3)
t a
(3)
t−1 a
(3)
t−2 · 0
· · · · ·
a
(n)
t a
(n)
t−1 a
(n)
t−2 · a(n)t−n+1

R
(j,n)
t+1 = min{P (j,n)t+1 , r(j,n)t+1 } ∈ R+ denotes the actual loan repayment of loan ant+1
at time t+ j.
Rt =

R
(1,1)
t 0 0 · 0
R
(1,2)
t R
(2,2)
t−1 0 · 0
R
(1,3)
t R
(2,3)
t−1 R
(3,3)
t−2 · 0
· · · · ·
R
(1,n)
t R
(2,n)
t−1 R
(3,n)
t−2 · R(n,n)t−n+1

denotes a time t actual loan repay-
ment matrix.
Mt =

m
(1,1)
t 0 0 · 0
m
(1,2)
t m
(2,2)
t−1 0 · 0
m
(1,3)
t m
(2,3)
t−1 m
(3,3)
t−2 · 0
· · · · ·
m
(1,n)
t m
(2,n)
t−1 m
(3,n)
t−2 · m(n,n)t−n+1

denotes a time t loan liquidation
value matrix.
l
(·,n)
t−k+1,t ∈ {0, 1} denotes a time t liquidation over the past loan a(n)t−k+1, k ≤ n,
where ′1′ if it is not liquidated, ′0′ if liquidated.
Ht−1 ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n denotes accumulated history matrix of liquidations.
lt ∈ {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n denotes a time t liquidation matrix over the portfolio LHt−1t
at time t, where L
Ht−1
t means the portfolio matrix of not-liquidated upto t.
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Now we present a formal banker problem,
Vt(L
Ht−1
t , Dt) = max
lt
{ max
at+1,rdt+1
log(ct(st)) + β
bEVt+1(LHtt+1, Dt+1)}
s.t.∀t, ct(st) = 1′n(Rt(st) ◦Ht−1 ◦ lt)1n + 1′n(Mt(st) ◦ (1− lt) ◦ T )1n − 1′nat+1(st+1)
+Dt+1(st+1)− rdtDt(st),
∀t,∀ st, ct(st) > 0,
{ωt+1(j, n) :
∫ ω(j,n)t+1
0
qt(ω)dω
∫ ω(j,n)t+1
0
kt+1(ω
(j,n)
t+1 )dω = a
(j,n)
t+1 } ⊂ {ωt+1(j, n)∗},
rdt+1 > 1 and take Dt+1 as given
k. Time of Events
At the beginning of each period, the state st revealed. Then renegotiation and liqui-
dation take place. After productions are conducted, incomes distributed and agents
make deliveries according to their contracts. Financial markets open and then agents
consume.
2. Market Clearing Conditions and Equilibrium
There are two financial markets and two goods markets. Loan market always auto-
matically clears, and also the deposit market clears by the model setting. The banker
take ∀st+1, Dt+1(st+1) =
∫
β
fgt+1(β)dt+1(st+1)dβ as given. By the Wallas’s Law, there-
fore, we need to clear only one market, the capital goods market. And the condition
is
∀st+1, 1′nat+1(st+1) =
∑
ω
(j,n)∗
t+1
∫ ω(j,n)∗t+1
0
qt(ω)dω
∫ ω(j,n)∗t+1
0
kt+1(ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 )dω.
We need a consistency condition which stems from the difference between the
capital in actual production process and that of banker’s total loans due to the results
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of liquidations. So, we states roughly that total economy’s capital should equal to
the sum of banker’s total loan and liquidated loan, and formally
∀st, Kt(st) =
n∑
i=1
h≥i
∑
ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
∫ ω(j,h)∗t−i+1
0
[
i∏
u=1
fφt−i+u(ω)]λ(ω)
i−1k{l
(j,h)
t =1}
t−i+1 (ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1)dω
+
n∑
i=1
h≥i
∑
ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
∫ ω(j,h)∗t−i+1
0
[
i∏
u=1
fφt−i+u(ω)]λ(ω)
i−1k{l
(j,h)
t =0}
t−i+1 (ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1)dω,
where Kt(st) denotes economy’s total capital goods in production process at time
t, and the first summation
∑n
i=1
h≥i
means the sum all capitals which has maturity h
traded i periods before.
Definition II.4. (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium) A recursive competitive equi-
librium is a set of gross deposit interest rate {rd(S)}, a set of policy functions for
households {cH(S), d(S)}, a set of policy functions for the banker
{cB(S), a(S), l(S), D(S)} and the probability measure Γ satisfies the followings,(1)
households’ policy functions are solutions to their problems taking rd(S),Γ given, (2)
banker’s policy functions are solutions to her problems with the incentive constraint,
taking Γ given, (3) capital goods market clears. And a set of total capitals {K(S)}
with liquidation policy functions {l(S)} satisfies the consistency conditions.
C. Characterization
1. Policy Functions
a. Aggregate Deposit of Households and The Banker’s Choice of rd
Since the banker can set the deposit interest rate rd, and since the households income
streams directly depend on the banker’s behavior, the banker can incorporate the
households problems into her problem. From the households optimizations, given
22
states and rd, the banker’s total deposit taking will be the following,
Dt+1(r
d
t+1; st+1,∆t+1) ≡
∫ ∫
fgt(β)d
∗
t+1(β, r
d
t+1; st+1,∆t+1)dβdh
where d∗t+1(β, r
d
t+1; st+1,∆t+1) is the optimal choice of household at time t, and ∆t+1
is the banker’s loan portfolio states, which will be explained soon. The household’s
optimal deposit d∗t+1(β, r
d
t+1; st+1,∆t+1) comes from the first order condition of the
households problem.
1 = Et,t+1[
βct(st)
ct+1(st+1)
rdt+1(st+1)],
where ct(st) = (1− α)At(∆∗t )α + rdt dt(β, rdt ; st,∆t)− dt+1(β, rdt+1; st+1,∆t+1).
Then the banker sets rd the aggregate deposit Dt+1(r
d
t+1; st+1,∆t+1) satisfies her
FOC,
1 = Et,t+1[
βbcbt(st)
cbt+1(st+1)
rdt+1(st+1)],
where cbt(st) is the banker’s consumption.
b. Simple Function Representation of Bank Optimal Portfolio
We denote
W
(j,n)
t+1 (L
Ht−1
t , Dt; st) the discounted sum of revenues from the loan a
(j,n)
t+1 (L
Ht−1
t , Dt; st) with
maturity n and liquidation plan j, then
W
(j,n)
t+1 (L
Ht−1
t , Dt; st) =
j−1∑
i=1
Et,t+i
(βb)iu′(ct+i(st+i))
u′(ct(st))
R
(i,n)
t+1
+P(Ψ(j,n)t+1 )Et,t+j
(βb)ju′(ct+j(st+j))
u′(ct(st))
m
(j,n)
t+1
+(1− P(Ψ(j,n)t+1 ))
n∑
i=j
Et,t+i
(βb)iu′(ct+i(st+i))
u′(ct(st))
R
(i,n)
t+1 ,
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where Ψ
(j,n)
t+1 ≡ {ψ(j,n)t+1 ∈ U (j,·) : rt+j < Pt+j, and rt+j < mt+j, given a(j,n)t+1 , At, φt} as
defined above. And for the loan of no liquidation plan a
(0,n)
t+1 (L
Ht−1
t , Dt; st),
W
(0,n)
t+1 (L
Ht−1
t , Dt; st) =
n∑
i=1
Et,t+i
(βb)iu′(ct+i(st+i))
u′(ct(st))
R
(i,n)
t+1 .
By the assumption II.2.(b), we know that the discounted sum of revenues of long
term loan is always bigger than that of short term loan, so we have
∀n < m,W (0,n)t+1 (L
Ht−1
t , Dt; st) < W
(0,m)
t+1 (L
Ht−1
t , Dt; st).
We assume that the discounted sum of future revenues is always bigger than
the current value of capital. This assumption is quite natural. If it is not, we don’t
need to have production process. By this assumption with the assumption 2.(a), the
discounted sum of early liquidation plan is always smaller than that of late liquidation
plan, so we have
∀i < j ≤ n,W (i,n)t+1 (LHt−1t , Dt; st) < W (j,n)t+1 (LHt−1t , Dt; st) < W (0,n)t+1 (LHt−1t , Dt; st).
Proposition II.5. (a) ∀n < m,W (0,n)t+1 (L
Ht−1
t , Dt; st) < W
(0,m)
t+1 (L
Ht−1
t , Dt; st). (b)
∀i <
j ≤ n,W (i,n)t+1 (LHt−1t , Dt; st) < W (j,n)t+1 (LHt−1t , Dt; st) < W (0,n)t+1 (LHt−1t , Dt; st).
We remember that ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 (At, φt) is fixed on the state space of (At, φt). Then, the
FOC of the banker problem for a
(j,n)
t+1 (L
Ht−1
t , Dt; st) is
1 = W
(j,n)
t+1 (L
Ht−1
t , Dt; st), ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 (At, φt) given.
Therefore, with this FOCs and the proposition 5.(a) show that there can be
only one optimal maturity if we do not allow liquidation, and the (b) tells us that
there can be multiple optimal maturities with liquidation plans, and if a loan with no
liquidation plan is optimal, then we can’t find optimal among the shorter maturity
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loans.
We suppose a set of optimal loan portfolios with the fixed efficient investment
interval of capital quality, {(a(j,n)∗t+1 (LHt−1t , Dt; st), ω(j,n)∗t+1 (At, φt))}. The each element
of the optimal portfolio set can be represented on the plane of R+ × Ω, since
a
(j,n)∗
t+1 (L
Ht−1
t , Dt; st) =
∫ ω(j,n)∗t+1
0
qt(ω)dω
∫
ω
X
[0,ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 ]
k
(j,n)∗
t+1 dω
= Qt(ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 )
∫
ω
X
[0,ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 ]
k
(j,n)∗
t+1 dω,
where
∫ ω(j,n)∗t+1
0
qt+1(ω)dω = Qt+1(ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 ) ∈ R+, since Qt+1(ω(j,n)∗t+1 ) depend only on the
interval [0, ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 ], and X[0,ω(j,n)∗t+1 ]
is an indicator function.
Now, we have a simple function representation of the optimal portfolio set,
∑
ω
(j,n)∗
t+1
a
(j,n)∗
t+1 =
∑
ω
(j,n)∗
t+1
Qt+1(ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 )k
(j,n)∗
t+1
∫
ω
X
[0,ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 ]
dω ≡ δ∗t+1(LHt−1t , Dt, ω(j,n)∗t+1 ; st).
Proposition II.6. The banker’s optimal loan portfolio has a simple function repre-
sentation.
With notational abuse, we denote the physical capital using the simple function
notation as follows,
δt+1/Qt+1 ≡
∑
ω
(j,n)∗
t+1
k
(j,n)∗
t+1
∫
ω
X
[0,ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 ]
dω.
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2. Two Period Representation of ′n′ Period Problem
a. Simple Function Representation of Portfolio
We denote ∆t the state of loan portfolio at time t, then
∆t =
n∑
i=1
h≥i
∑
ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
[
i−2∏
u=0
l
(j,h)
t−i+1,t−i+1+u]Qt−i+1(ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1)k
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
∫
ω
X
[0,ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1]
[
i∏
u=1
fφt−i+u(ω)]λ(ω)
i−1dω
where
i−2∏
u=0
l
(j,h)
t−i+1,t−i+1+u = 1, if a
(j,h)∗
t−i+1 is not liquidated from time t− i+1 to time t−1,
i−2∏
u=0
l
(j,h)
t−i+1,t−i+1+u = 0, if a
(j,h)∗
i is liquidated before time t− 1, therefore ∆t is the sum
of all loans which is not liquidated and maturity is not passed h ≥ i.
Then we can denote the state of physical capital induced by the state of loan
portfolio ∆t/Qt,
∆t/Qt =
n∑
i=1
h≥i
∑
ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
[
i−1∏
u=0
l
(j,h)
t−i+1,t−i+1+u]k
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
∫
ω
X
[0,ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1]
[
i∏
u=1
fφt−i+u(ω)]λ(ω)
i−1dω.
With notational abuse, we denote ∆t = l
1
t∆t + l
0
t∆t, where l
1
t∆t is the not liquidated
time t portfolio state, l0t∆t is the liquidated time t portfolio state.
l1t∆t =
n∑
i=1
h≥i
∑
ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
[
i−1∏
u=0
l
(j,h)
t−i+1,t−i+1+u]Qt−i+1(ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1)k
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
×
∫
ω
X
[0,ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1]
[
i∏
u=1
fφt−i+u(ω)]λ(ω)
i−1dω.
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l0t∆t =
n∑
i=1
h≥i
∑
ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
[1−
i−1∏
u=0
l
(j,h)
t−i+1,t−i+1+u]Qt−i+1(ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1)k
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
×
∫
ω
X
[0,ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1]
[
i∏
u=1
fφt−i+u(ω)]λ(ω)
i−1dω.
Then ∆t+1 = l
1
t∆t + δ
∗
t+1.
And the physical capital states have,
l1t∆t/Qt =
n∑
i=1
h≥i
∑
ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
[
i−1∏
u=0
l
(j,h)
t−i+1,t−i+1+u]k
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
×
∫
ω
X
[0,ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1]
[
i∏
u=1
fφt−i+u(ω)]λ(ω)
i−1dω,
l0t∆t/Qt =
n∑
i=1
h≥i
∑
ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
[1−
i−1∏
u=0
l
(j,h)
t−i+1,t−i+1+u]k
(j,h)∗
t−i+1
×
∫
ω
X
[0,ω
(j,h)∗
t−i+1]
[
i∏
u=1
fφt−i+u(ω)]λ(ω)
i−1dω,
and define an operator Υ(fφ,λ)(X)(ω) =
∫
fφ(ω)λ(ω)X(ω)dω, and Υ(fφ)(X)(ω) =∫
fφ(ω)X(ω)dω, then the beginning of time t+ 1 physical capital state ∆t+1/Qt+1 is
∆t+1/Qt+1 = Υ(fφt+1 ,λ)(l
1
t∆t/Qt) + Υ(fφt+1 )(δt+1/Qt+1).
b. Budget Set
We can get the banker’s budget set as of the simple functional form. The total time
t revenues from existing loans will be
γ{αAt[l1t∆t/Qt]α +Qt(l0t∆t/Qt)},
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where Qt(l
0
t (∆t)/Qt) is the total revenues from liquidations with notational abuse.
Then we have the time t budgets given the liquidation matrix lt as follows,
ct(st) = γαAt[Υ(fφt )(l
1
t∆t/Qt)]
α + γQt(l
0
t∆t/Qt)− δt+1(st+1) +Dt+1(st+1)− rdtDt(st).
c. The Banker’s Optimal Portfolio Problem
With the above simple function representations of optimal loan policy, and loan port-
folio states, we can change the banker’s ′n′ periods problem to ′2′ periods problem.
Due to this characterization, we can find the equilibrium sets of policies, values and
prices by computations.
Vt(∆t/Qt, Dt, st) maxlt{maxrdt+1,δt+1 log(ct(st)) + βbEVt+1(∆t+1/Qt+1, Dt+1, st+1)}
s.t.∀t, ct(st) = γαAt[Υ(fφt )(l
1
t∆t/Qt)]
α+γQt(l
0
t∆t/Qt)−δt+1(st+1)+Dt+1(st+1)−
rdtDt(st),
∀t,∀ st, ct(st) > 0, and rdt (st) > 1,
ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 (st), Qt+1(ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 ), Dt+1(r
d
t+1; st+1,∆t+1) ≡
∫
fgt(β)d
∗
t+1(β, r
d
t+1; st+1,∆t+1)dβ
given.
Since the simple function has the following rectangular shape, the loan portfolio
choice problem changes to a problem choosing the height k
(j,n)∗
t+1 of the given width of
the rectangular.
Vt(∆t, Dt, st) = maxlt{maxrdt+1,{k(j,n)∗t+1 } log(ct(st)) + β
bEVt+1(∆t+1, Dt+1, st+1)}
s.t.∀t, ct(st) = γαAt[Υ(fφt )(l
1
t (∆t)/Qt)]
α + γQt(l
0
t (∆t)/Qt)
−∑
ω
(j,n)∗
t+1
{Qt+1(ω(j,n)∗t+1 )k(j,n)∗t+1
∫
ω
X
[0,ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 ]
dω}+Dt+1(st+1)− rdtDt(st),
∀t,∀ st, ct(st) > 0, and rdt (st) > 1,
ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 (st), Qt+1(ω
(j,n)∗
t+1 ) given.
Take Dt+1(r
d
t+1; st+1,∆t+1) ≡
∫ ∫
fgt(β)d
∗
t+1(β, r
d
t+1; st+1,∆t+1)dβdh as given.
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D. Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we present three numerical experiments designed to illustrate how
the bank achieves the optimal loan portfolio, total deposit taking and the optimal
liquidation plan. The first experiment will show the bank optimal behavior in normal
economic situation, and then we change some parameter values and transition matri-
ces for the model to resemble an economy in recession ( we call the economy ”produc-
tivity shocked economy” ). Moreover, we postulate a ”liquidity shocked economy,”
where households consume more, and save less due to the pessimistic expectation for
the future.
1. Computation
Using simple function characterization of our problem, we construct a loan portfolio
state space. It has n dimensional size. Our optimality condition gives us a method of
reduction technique. First, the simple functional forms will have a limited type. For
instance, if n = 3, the total types of simple function only 10. And second, they are
ordered by optimality.1 Therefore, the space is sectorized according to the order. For
a multi-assets sector, there will be a non-visited area. For example, the non visited
area violates the proposition 5. The number of grids reduces to 1/4 for the section of
1The 10 types of simple functions are ordered by the optimality, and the order is,
1. a(3)
2. a(2), a(2,3)
3. a(2), a(1,3)
4. a(2)
5. a(1), a(1,2), a(2,3)
6. a(1), a(1,2), a(1,3)
7. a(1), a(2,3)
8. a(1), a(1,3)
9. a(1), a(1,2)
10. a(1).
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two assets, and 1/48 for that of three assets. Figure 1 shows the initial loan portfolio
of a bank.
As a result, the efficient intervals are figured by the production side technologies,
which is largely depend on depreciation, and capital goods cost factors. We set up
these functions are satisfied with the technology arbitrage conditions. Next, house-
holds problems are incorporated in bank’s problem, and also producers have nothing
to choose.
2. Parameters
We have three types of parameters, which are macro economic parameters ( produc-
tion technology A, α, time preference for household and bank β, βb, and the banker’s
loan collection skill γ ), capital quality parameters ( remaining portion after depre-
ciation λ(ω), capital goods price q(ω), and maturity factor η ), and distributional
parameters (for household distribution over time preference Fg(h) and capital quality
shock fφ(ω) ). The efficient intervals of capital quality is very sensitive to the three
functions fφ(ω), λ(ω), q(ω). We set up those functions to guarantee
′3′ loans in the
model economy. Table I displays specific values and functions which we adopt for
calibration.
3. Standardized Loan Contracts
From the specific parameter values and function forms, we can standardize loan con-
tracts. The intervals ωt(n) = {ω : N(ω0, η, φt) = n} of capital qualities and the
efficient investment capital qualities ω
(·,n)∗
t for different loan maturities are shown
in table II. For example, producer should hire the interval of capital quality from
[0, 0.9077] to [0, 1], for the maturity ′3′ period investment, and the efficient investment
can be done when the producer hires [0, 0.9077]. For the ′2′ period loan, the efficient
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level of investment is [0, 0.5336], and [0, 0.0967] for ′1′ period investment.
Table III shows the stream of revenues for the different maturity loans, and
table IV exhibits liquidation values. The banker’s revenues from ′3′ period loan are
0.7150, 0.6286, 0.5661 each period for the unit amount of loan, when the states is
”good” and ”low.” Therefore the total revenue of ′3′ period loan is 1.9097, which is
the highest. When the banker lends one unit amount for ′2′ period, she expects total
revenue of 1.586. For the ′1′ period loan, 1.2571 of revenue is expected. The shorter
loan has more liquidity, but not profitable. The longer loan promises bigger revenue,
but less liquid. The liquidation values are less than the investment amount, therefore
liquidation means a loss.
4. Simulation Strategy
We will examine the banker’s optimal loan portfolio, deposit taking and liquidation
plan given the economy’s states. First, we find out the optimalities when the states
are normal. Then, we makes the economy in the middle of recession, where the
productivity is low, and it is persistent. Lastly, a deep recession will be simulated,
where deposit reduces and it is also persistent, and the maximum of deposit interest
rate rises from 1.5 to 2.0.
For the three different shocks, we set transition matrices for the ”normal econ-
omy”, ”productivity shocked economy”, and ”liquidity shocked economy,” by table
V, table VI, and table VII, respectively.
5. Results
The summary results of (1) normal economy, (2) productivity shocked economy,
and (3) liquidity shocked economy are shown by VIII, where (A × Φ × G) is in
(good,low,normal) and in (bad,high,shock) states, respectively. Figures from 2 to 9
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show the results of normal economy, figures from 10 to 17 show the results of pro-
ductivity shocked economy, and figures from 18 to 25 show the results of liquidity
shocked economy.
When a ”normal” economy is in (good,low,normal) states, the banker takes
2.1576 amount as deposits from households, and lends 7.1108 amount to produc-
ers, and gets 9.6167 amount as revenues from the loans. While a ”liquidity shocked”
economy is in (bad,high,shock) states, the banker takes 1.6810 amount as deposits
from households, and lends 2.7105 amount to producers, and gets 5.5245 amount as
revenues from the loans.
a. Loan Portfolio
The normal economy has whole period loan portfolio, whereas the productivity shocked
economy in (bad,high,shock) states has one a(1) and three a(3) period loans, and the
liquidity shocked economy in (bad,high,shock) states has only the shortest term loan
a(1). The normal economy in (good,low,normal) states has 72.6% of loans as the
shortest maturity, 13.3% as two period, and 14.1% as the longest maturity. If the
states changes to (bad,high,shock) states, the proportion of the shortest term loan
is increased to 75.2%, and that of the mid term is decreased to 10.7%. Whereas the
longest term shows no changes in the proportion.
When economies are in (good,low,normal) states, if economy is changed from
productivity shocked to liquidity shocked, then the proportion of the longest term
loan reduced from 14.1% to 12.1%, and the mid term loan increased from 10.7% to
12.7%.
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b. Aggregate Deposit and Interest Rate
Productivity shock cannot affect total deposit, however liquidity shock reduces total
deposit 17.5% in (good,low,normal) states, and 21.0% in (bad,high,shock) states.
When the states of economy changes from (good,low,normal) to (bad,high,shock),
total deposit of ”normal” and ”productivity shocked” economies decreases 1.4%, while
that of ”liquidity shocked” economy decreases 5.6%. The interest rate of deposit
wouldn’t change with the productivity shock, but the liquidity shock could affect the
interest rate.
c. Total Output and Revenue of Bank
The total output and bank revenue are not different so big between (good,low,normal)
and (bad,high,shock) states, when the economy is in ”normal.” However, it reduced
by 35.8% when the economy was in ”productivity shocked.”
E. Conclusion
Long term asset creates more revenue, however it is riskier in a liquidity sense. Our
question is: How does a liquidity constrained bank make decisions between profitabil-
ity and liquidity? We present a computable DSGE model of banks optimal portfolio
choices under liquidity constraints. We borrow major concepts from Diamond and Ra-
jan (2001) : relationship lending, specialized skills in loan collection, renegotiation,
and liquidation process. Our theory predicts that liquidation plays an important
role in a bank’s portfolio model. Even though liquidation is an off-equilibrium phe-
nomenon, banks can have rich loan portfolios due to the possibility of liquidation.
Liquidity condition is a key factor in banks portfolio.
Our model provides a good understanding of the possibility of loan liquidations.
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This possibility ensures a bank have a portfolio of loans with different maturities, even
if they do not have credit risks. We analyze the banks’ loan business with different
maturities. This is not easy, because of the curse of dimensions. We provide a useful
method to evade this computational problem in a very limited sense.
Long term loans are profitable for the banker and provide benefits to the pro-
ducers and the households, since it produces more. However, they have a limitation
in liquidity. When a liquidity shock is expected, loan maturities will be shorter.
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CHAPTER III
SECURITIZATION AND BANK OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO CHOICE
A. Introduction
As Rajan (2006) pointed out, banking business has changed to more risky areas,
due to technical change, deregulation and institutional change. Banks improve their
risk management abilities and risk taking capacities. This trend is an inevitable
consequence of severe competitions. The above three factors have pushed up the
banks for more profitability to survive. Banks have to involve in high profit business
like securities, derivatives and exotic new financial products. Boyd and Nicolo (2005)
argued that the risky business of banks is a rational choice due to the competition.
Banking business is quite different from their traditional aspects. They have many
securities and trading assets in their balance sheets. Without the securitization, we
could not explain nowadays banking business properly. Securitization in banking
business makes better off our economy in good seasons definitely. However, with
the depressed securities market, banks can deepen the business cycles. Banks’ debts
are largely short term deposit. Many literatures analyze the securities business in
banking, however, very few directly connecting the securities to the bank’s short term
liabilities. We provide a useful tool to analyze bank’s traditional loan and deposit
business connected with new securities business.
Recent sub-prime mortgage crisis is believed that banks misalignments of re-
sources is a main cause. There are many literatures analyzing this crisis with finan-
cial frictions(Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2010)). Our model provides why banks
should involve in securities business, and how crisis evolves inherently in the bank’s
securities business.
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Our theory predicts that the bank securities business makes a chasm between
a real liquidity of economy and market liquidity. Banks can have more liquidity by
selling their securitized loans, and as our previous model already pointed out, a good
liquidity condition push the bank more profitable but less liquid long term loans. As
a consequence, long-term loans are accumulated, and every participant happy with
this securitization, simply because long term loan gives higher revenue. However,
the economy has less liquidity in short term. Any market turbulence can invoke a
problem in economy wide liquidity. Therefore bank regulators and macroeconomic
policy agencies should make a brake to the securities business of banks. We suppose
a liquidity taxation in banks’ securities business as a provision for the shortage of
liquidity and government direct money injections to the market as a crisis response.
B. The Model Outline
We define securitization in banking business selling loan contract with market price.
Compared with liquidation, bank sell the contract at any time it is optimal, and the
selling price depends on the future revenues not on the liquidation value. The selling
of loan contract is on the equilibrium path, whereas the liquidation only takes place
on the off equilibrium path. The optimal amount of a
(j,n)
t+1 (Et, Lt−1, Dt; st) which will
be securitized and sold time t+ j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,comes from
1 =
j−1∑
k=1
Et,t+k
u′(ct+k(st+k))
u′(ct(st))
R
(k,n)
t+1 + Et,t+j
u′(ct+j(st+j))
u′(ct(st))
Q
(j,n)
t+j
where Q
(j,n)
t+j = ψ
∑n
k=j Et+j,t+kΛt+j,t+kR
(k,n)
t+1 is the selling price, and Λt+j,t+k is the
buyer’s stochastic discount factor, ψ < 1 represents some cost in securitization and
also lower collection skills of buyer or less efforts of the banker on the loan collection
she already sold out. Since the selling of a
(j,n)
t+1 is on the equilibrium path, the loan
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contract will be considered as a ′j′ period asset not ′n′ period asset. The liquidity map
of the banker is good enough to lend more profitable long-term loans. Output, income,
and profit increase by this securitization. As a result, good liquidity conditions of the
bank will reduce the banker’s attraction to taking deposits. In addition, real liquidity
in economy reduces by these two directions: actual investment on long term projects
and decreased creation of new liquidity. The US economy before the recent mortgage
crisis showed a great boom of securitization with liquidity depletion. As expected, a
crisis any time possible with a bad shock in this situation.
Our model can explain the cause of the crisis and suggest policy responses to
the securitization of banking business. Suppose a shock occurs in securities market,
so that some securities loose the marketability. Then the assets for securities are no
longer considered as ′j′ term assets, it should be considered to be ′n′ period assets.
This makes the liquidity condition of the bank worse all at once. The bank’s default
risk and the bank-run risk will be very high. The banker operates cash and short-
term loan more to secure her viability. Thus output and income decrease, so deposit.
These are the results of deep securitization and a sudden shock.
C. Preliminary Results
We conducted some experimental simulations using the same framework of the pre-
vious chapter. So, the result is limited, in that the households’ behaviors are not
fully analyzed. Our simple and primitive computation suggests that securitization in
banking business makes the bank have longer term loans even if a liquidity shock is
expected. Output and bank’s revenue are bigger when the bank involves in securiti-
zation. The summary results are shown by IX.
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D. Conclusion
Banking business is quite different from their traditional aspects. We cannot separate
a securities business from nowadays banking industry. They have many securities and
trading assets in their balance sheets. Without the securitization, we could not explain
nowadays banking business properly. Securitization in banking business makes better
off our economy in good seasons definitely. However, with the depressed securities
market, banks can deepen the business cycles. Bank’s debts are largely short term
deposit. Our theory predicts that the bank securities business produces a chasm
between a real liquidity of economy and market liquidity. Banks can have more
liquidity by selling their securitized loans, and as our model already pointed out, a
good liquidity condition makes the bank more profitable but less liquid long term
loans. As a consequence, long term loans are accumulated and every participant is
happy with this securitization, simply because a long term loan gives higher revenue.
However, the economy has less liquidity in short term. Any market turbulence can
invoke a problem in economy wide liquidity.
Recent mortgage crisis cause us to reconsider the securities business of a bank.
Our model can explain the liquidity depletion with the progress of bank’s securitiza-
tion as we saw in the early 2000’s. Banks securitization makes liquidity confusions.
This can not be a problem in good times, however, it can be a severe problem. Even
we cannot notice this real liquidity depletion when economy is in a boom. We will
have a model of this process and can suggest policy responses.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
Our model provides a good understanding of the possibility of loan liquidations. This
possibility ensures a bank have a portfolio of loans with different maturities, even
if they do not have credit risks. We analyze the banks’ loan business with different
maturities. This is not easy, because of the curse of dimensions. We provide a useful
method to evade this computational problem in a very limited sense.
Long term loans are profitable for the banker and provide benefits to the pro-
ducers and the households, since it produces more. However, they have a limitation
in liquidity. When a liquidity shock is expected, loan maturities will be shorter.
We cannot separate a securities business from nowadays banking industry. Se-
curitization provides many benefits to the economy. However, recent mortgage crisis
cause us to reconsider the securities business of a bank. Our model can explain the
liquidity depletion with the progress of bank’s securitization as we saw in the early
2000’s. Banks securitization makes liquidity confusions. This can not be a problem
in good times, however, it can be a severe problem. Even we cannot notice this real
liquidity depletion when economy is in a boom. We will have a model of this process
and can suggest policy responses.
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APPENDIX A
HOUSEHOLD OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO PROBLEM
- To find solution concepts of our model.
I. Environments
1. Time, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
2. Endowments
- e0 > 0, e1 > 0, e2 = e3 = 0.
3. Expenditure shock at time t = 1
- hS1 > 0 with Pr(h
S
1 ) = p, h
N
1 = 0 with Pr(h
N
1 ) = 1− p
4. Two assets
- long-term assets ( aL ) : one unit of aLt+1 gives 3 period-coupons
(δLRLt+1, δ
LRLt+2, δ
LRLt+3) = (.68, .41, .24)
- short-term assets ( aS ) : one unit of aSt+1 gives 2 period-coupons
(δSRSt+1, δ
SRSt+2) = (.78, .34)
- each asset can be liquidated before matures with it’s liquidation value : if aLt+1
is liquidated (lLt+1 = 1), then the liquidation value is δ
Llt+1(a
L
t+1) = .774, and a
S
t+1,
δSlt+1(a
S
t+1) = .782 for the unit amount of investment.
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* Final goods production for reference
- High quality technology ( IH ) : one unit of it gives 3 period-coupons
(RLt+1(st+1), R
L
t+2(st+2), R
L
t+3(st+3)) = ((.76(G), .73(B)), (.46(G), .44(B)), (.28(G), .26(B)).
- Low quality technology ( IL ) : one unit of it gives 2 period-coupons
(RSt+1(st+1), R
S
t+2(st+2)) = ((.87(G), .83(B)), (.39(G), .37(B))).
* α = 0.2, A(G) = 4.5, A(B) = 4.3, ϕ(H) = 0.87, ϕ(L) = 0.85, λ(H) =
0.09, λ(L) = 0.02, Q(H) = 2, Q(L) = 1
II. Households Problems without financial intermediaries
1. Time 0
V0 = max
aL1 ,a
S
1 ,x1
βE[V1(a
L
1 , a
S
1 , x1)]
st. aL1 (ξ1) + a
S
1 (ξ1) + x1(ξ1) = e0
2. Time 1
V1(a
L
1 , a
S
1 , x1) = max

maxaS2 ,x2,lL1 ,lS1 log(c1) + βE[V2(a
L
1 , a
S
1 , a
S
2 , x2)],
maxaS2 ,x2,lL1 ,lS1 log(c1) + βE[V2(a
L
1 , a
S
2 , x2)],
maxaS2 ,x2,lL1 ,lS1 log(c1) + βE[V2(a
S
1 , a
S
2 , x2)],
maxaS2 ,x2,lL1 ,lS1 log(c1) + βE[V2(a
S
2 , x2)]

st. c1(ξ1) + a
S
2 + x2 +H1(ξ1) =
e1 + δ
LRL1 (s1)1{lL1 = 0}aL1 + δLl1(aL1 )1{lL1 = 1}aL1 +
δSRS1 1{lS1 = 0}aS1 + δSl1(aS1 )1{lS1 = 1}aS1 + x1(ξ1)
44
3. Time 2
V2(a
L
1 , a
S
1 , a
S
2 , x2) = max
 maxx3,l
s
2
log(c2) + βE[V3(a
L
1 , a
S
2 , x3)],
maxx3,ls2 log(c2) + βE[V3(a
L
1 , x3)]

st. c2 + x3 =
δLRL2 1{lL1 = 0}aL1 + δSRS2 1{lS1 = 0}aS1 + δSRS1 1{lS2 = 0}aS2 + δSl1(aS2 )1{lS2 = 1}aS2 + x2
V2(a
L
1 , a
S
2 , x2) = max
 maxx3,l
s
2
log(c2) + βE[V3(a
L
1 , a
S
2 , x3)],
maxx3,ls2 log(c2) + βE[V3(a
L
1 , x3)]

st. c2 + x3 =
δLRL2 1{lL1 = 0}aL1 + δSRS1 1{lS2 = 0}aS2 + δSl1(aS2 )1{lS2 = 1}aS2 + x2
V2(a
S
1 , a
S
2 , x2) = max
{
maxx3,ls2 log(c2) + βE[V3(a
S
2 , x3)],maxx3,ls2 log(c2) + βE[V3(x3)]
}
st. c2 + x3 =
δSRS2 1{lS1 = 0}aS1 + δSRS1 1{lS2 = 0}aS2 + δSl1(aS2 )1{lS2 = 1}aS2 + x2
V2(a
S
2 , x2) = max
{
maxx3,ls2 log(c2) + βE[V3(a
S
2 , x3)],maxx3,ls2 log(c2) + βE[V3(x3)]
}
st. c2 + x3 = δ
SRS1 1{lS2 = 0}aS2 + δSl1(aS2 )1{lS2 = 1}aS2 + x2
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4. Time 3
V3(a
L
1 , a
S
2 , x3) = max log(c3)
st. c3 = δ
LRL3 1{lL1 = 0}aL1 + δSRS2 1{lS2 = 0}aS2 + x3
V3(a
L
1 , x3) = max log(c3)
st. c3 = δ
LRL3 1{lL1 = 0}aL1 + x3
V3(a
S
2 , x3) = max log(c3)
st. c3 = δ
SRS2 1{lS2 = 0}aS2 + x3
V3(x3) = max log(c3)
st. c3 = x3
III. Solutions for Households Problems without financial intermediaries
1. More Assumptions for Calculations
- For final results by hand calculations, use the following figures whenever arriving
a dead end,
β = 0.98, e1 = 1.75, h1 = 2.5, p = 0.2
- Surviving endowment at time 0, e0 > 0.75 = h1 − e1
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2. Optimal Choices
- ((aL1 , a
S
1 , x1), {(c1, aS2 , x2, lL1 , lS1 ;hN1 ), (c2, x3, lS2 ), (c3)},
{(c1, aS2 , x2, lL1 , lS1 ;hS1 ), (c2, x3, lS2 ), (c3)})
(1) e0 > 1.969⇒ long-term assets(aL1 ) only, No liquidation, No corner solution(aS2 >
0) at time 1 shock.
t = 0, (aL1 , a
S
1 , x1) = (e0, 0, 0)
( No expenditure shock )
t = 1, (c1, a
S
2 , x2, l
L
1 , l
S
1 ;h
N
1 ) = (0.5952 + 0.4286e0, 1.1548 + 0.2514e0, 0, 0, 0;h
N
1 ),
t = 2, (c2, x3, l
S
2 ) = (0.6532 + 0.4705e0, 0.2475 + 0.1356e0, 0)
t = 3, (c3) = (0.6401 + 0.4611e0)
( Expenditure shock )
t = 1, (c1, a
S
2 , x2, l
L
1 , l
S
1 ;h
S
1 ) = (−0.2551+0.4286e0,−0.4949+0.2514e0, 0, 0, 0;hS1 ),
t = 2, (c2, x3, l
S
2 ) = (−0.2799 + 0.4705e0,−0.1061 + 0.1356e0, 0)
t = 3, (c3) = (−0.2744 + 0.4611e0)
(2) 1.969 > e0 > 1.149 ⇒ long-term assets(aL1 ) only, No liquidation, Corner
solution(aS2 = 0) at time 1 shock.
t = 0, (aL1 , a
S
1 , x1) = (e0, 0, 0)
( No expenditure shock )
t = 1, (c1, a
S
2 , x2, l
L
1 , l
S
1 ;h
N
1 ) = (0.5952 + 0.4286e0, 1.1548 + 0.2514e0, 0, 0, 0;h
N
1 ),
t = 2, (c2, x3, l
S
2 ) = (0.6532 + 0.4705e0, 0.2475 + 0.1356e0, 0)
t = 3, (c3) = (0.6401 + 0.4611e0)
( Expenditure shock )
47
t = 1, (c1, a
S
2 , x2, l
L
1 , l
S
1 ;h
S
1 ) = (−0.75 + 0.68e0, 0, 0, 0, 0;hS1 ),
t = 2, (c2, x3, l
S
2 ) = (0.3283e0, 0.0817e0, 0)
t = 3, (c3) = (0.3217e0)
(3) 1.149 > e0 > 1.072 ⇒ short-term assets(aS1 ) only, No Liquidation, Corner
solution(aS2 = 0) at time 1 shock.
t = 0, (aL1 , a
S
1 , x1) = (0, e0, 0)
( No expenditure shock )
t = 1, (c1, a
S
2 , x2, l
L
1 , l
S
1 ;h
N
1 ) = (0.5952 + 0.3685e0, 1.1548 + 0.4115e0, 0, 0, 0;h
N
1 ),
t = 2, (c2, x3, l
S
2 ) = (0.6532 + 0.4045e0, 0.2475 + 0.2565e0, 0)
t = 3, (c3) = (0.6401 + 0.3964e0)
( Expenditure shock )
t = 1, (c1, a
S
2 , x2, l
L
1 , l
S
1 ;h
S
1 ) = (−0.75 + 0.78e0, 0, 0, 0, 0;hS1 ),
t = 2, (c2, x3, l
S
2 ) = (0.1717e0, 0.1683e0, 0)
t = 3, (c3) = (0.1683e0)
(4) 1.072 > e0 > 0.75 ⇒ long-term assets and cash(aL1 & x1), No liquidation,
Corner solution(aS2 = 0) at time 1 shock.
t = 0, (aL1 , a
S
1 , x1) = (a
L∗
1 , 0, x
∗
1)
- aL∗1 =
−(2.0972+0.0568e0)+
√
(2.0972+0.0568e0)2+0.7691(e20+e0−1.3125)
0.8846
- x∗1 =
(2.0972+0.9414e0)−
√
(2.0972+0.0568e0)2+0.7691(e20+e0−1.3125)
0.8846
- ex) (e0 = .75 ⇒ aL∗1 = 0, x∗1 = .75), (e0 = 1.00 ⇒ aL∗1 = .135, x∗1 = .865), (e0 =
1.072⇒ aL∗1 = .177, x∗1 = .895),
48
( No expenditure shock )
t = 1, (c1, a
S
2 , x2, l
L
1 , l
S
1 ;h
N
1 ) = (0.5952+0.4286a
L∗
1 +0.3401x
∗
1, 1.1548+0.2514a
L∗
1 +
0.6599x∗1, 0, 0, 0;h
N
1 ),
t = 2, (c2, x3, l
S
2 ) = (0.6532+0.4705a
L∗
1 +0.3732x
∗
1, 0.2475+0.1356a
L∗
1 +0.1415x
∗
1, 0)
t = 3, (c3) = (0.2475 + 0.3756a
L∗
1 + 0.1415x
∗
1)
( Expenditure shock )
t = 1, (c1, a
S
2 , x2, l
L
1 , l
S
1 ;h
S
1 ) = (−0.75 + 0.68aL∗1 + x∗1, 0, 0, 0, 0;hS1 ),
t = 2, (c2, x3, l
S
2 ) = (0.3238a
L∗
1 , 0.0817a
L∗
1 , 0)
t = 3, (c3) = (0.3217a
L∗
1 )
(4) e0 < 0.75⇒ arbitrary
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APPENDIX B
TABLES AND FIGURES
Table I. Parameter Values
Parameters Value Note
Macro economic parameters:
A {AG, AL} = {4.0, 3.0 ∼ 3.9} AG : TFP for ”Good” states
AB : TFP for ”Bad” states
α 0.2 Capital share
β [β, β] = [0.8, 0.99] Discount factor for households
βb 0.99 Discount factor for banker
γ 0.85 ∼ 0.95 Banker’s loan collection skill
Capital quality parameters:
λ(ω) −0.3 cos(piω0.55) + 0.45 1− depreciation rate
q(ω) 2 sin(pi(ω − 0.25)3) + 0.5 Cost of capital goods production
η 0.2 Capital goods maturity factor
Distributional parameters:
Fg(h)
∫ (h−β)κ
(1−β)κ Households distribution over time preference
where κ = 1.2 for ”Normal” states, κ = 1.08 ∼ 1.17 for ”Shock” states
fφ(ω) 0.05 cos(0.5piω) + 0.965, Capital quality shock for ”Low” states
0.05 sin(0.5pi(ω − 1)) + 1.025 Capital quality shock for ”High” states
Table II. Interval of Capital Quality for ωt(n), and Efficient Capital Quality of ω
(·,n)∗
t
ωt(1) ωt(2) ωt(3)
Low [0.0967∗, 0.5536) [0.5536∗, 0.9077) [0.9077∗, 1]
High [0.0989∗, 0.5556) [0.5556∗, 0.9063) [0.9063∗, 1]
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Table III. Banker’s Revenues from n Period Loans a(n)
a(1) a(2) a(3)
1st 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 3rd
Good & Low 1.2571 0.8624 0.7236 0.7150 0.6286 0.5661
Good & High 1.2497 0.8608 0.7226 0.7154 0.6290 0.5665
Bad & Low 1.2412 0.8515 0.7213 0.7059 0.6266 0.5656
Bad & High 1.2338 0.8499 0.7203 0.7063 0.6270 0.5660
Table IV. Banker’s jth Period Liquidation Values of n Period Loans a(j,n)
a(1,2) a(1,3) a(2,3)
Low 0.9922 0.9941 0.5305
High 0.9881 0.9926 0.5300
Table V. Transition Matrices for Normal Economy
states of economy states of technology states of liquidity
Good Bad Low High Normal Shock
Good 3/4 1/4 Low 2/3 1/3 Normal 3/5 2/5
Bad 1/2 1/2 High 1/2 1/2 Shock 1/2 1/2
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Table VI. Transition Matrices for Productivity Shocked Economy
states of economy states of technology states of liquidity
Good Bad Low High Normal Shock
Good 1/2 1/2 Low 2/3 1/3 Normal 3/5 2/5
Bad 1/4 3/4 High 1/2 1/2 Shock 1/2 1/2
Table VII. Transition Matrices for Liquidity Shocked Economy
states of economy states of technology states of liquidity
Good Bad Low High Normal Shock
Good 3/4 1/4 Low 2/3 1/3 Normal 1/2 1/2
Bad 1/2 1/2 High 1/2 1/2 Shock 2/5 3/5
Table VIII. Optimal Choices and Related Results of Bank Portfolio Problem
Good, Low & Normal Bad, High & Shock
Normal Productivity Liquidity Normal Productivity Liquidity
shocked shocked shocked shocked
Loan(1), a(1) 5.1637 4.7791 4.7019 4.7791 3.3360 2.7105
Loan(2), a(2) 0.9444 0.6835 0.7951 0.6835 0 0
Loan(3), a(3) 1.0027 0.8934 0.7532 0.8934 0.6093 0
Loan total,
∑
a 7.1108 6.3560 6.2503 6.3560 4.0482 2.7105
Deposit, D 2.1576 2.1576 1.7807 2.1273 2.1273 1.6810
interest rate, rd 1.4592 1.4592 1.9175 1.4592 1.4592 1.9175
Total output, Y 26.7130 25.8246 25.5719 25.1784 16.5904 15.3460
Bank Revenue, R 9.6167 9.2969 9.2059 9.0654 5.9750 5.5245
Survival Rate(%) 23.72 17.12 14.71 17.12 3.60 0.90
This table shows the average statistics of which equilibrium point has strictly positive total loan. The survival rate is
calculated of the number of strictly positive total loan equilibria over the total grid numbers.
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Table IX. Optimal Choices and Related Results of Bank Portfolio Problem with Se-
curitization
Good, Low & Comportable Bad, High & Tight
Normal Liquidity Normal Liquidity
shock shock
Loan(1), a(1) 5.3327 5.1179 4.9975 2.7105
Loan(2), a(2) 1.6939 1.4968 0.6476 0.9821
Loan(3), a(3) 1.1743 0.6815 0.7485 0
Loan total,
∑
a 7.8435 7.2963 6.8195 3.8018
Deposit, D 2.1434 1.7807 2.0628 1.6810
interest rate, rd 1.5000 1.9175 1.5000 1.9175
Total output, Y 27.1358 26.6799 25.9563 15.4348
Bank output,Y b 27.0803 26.6594 25.9068 15.3905
Bank Revenue,
∑
R 11.0582 10.7868 10.2612 6.0089
Securited loan, Q 1.3093 1.2005 0.6382 0.8972
Survival Rate(%) 27.63 22.82 19.22 2.70
This table shows the average statistics of which equilibrium point has strictly positive total loan, where the bank has
securities business.
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Fig. 1. Initial Loan Portfolio
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Fig. 2. Optimal Loan Portfolio Choice(1) of Normal Situation
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Fig. 3. Optimal Loan Portfolio Choice(2) of Normal Situation
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Fig. 4. Optimal Loan Portfolio Choice(3) of Normal Situation
57
0 200 400
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
deposit taking given states(G,L,N)
0 200 400
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
deposit taking given states(B,L,N)
0 200 400
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
deposit taking given states(G,L,T)
0 200 400
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
deposit taking given states(B,L,T)
Fig. 5. Optimal Deposit Interest Rate of Normal Situation
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Fig. 6. Optimal Deposit Amount of Normal Situation
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Fig. 7. Optimal Liquidation Policy of Normal Situation
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Fig. 8. Total Output of Normal Situation
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Fig. 9. Bank Revenue of Normal Situation
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Fig. 10. Optimal Loan Portfolio Choice(1) of Productivity Shock Situation
63
0 100 200 300 400
0
5
10
15
optimal loan(1) given states(G,L,S)
0 100 200 300 400
0
1
2
3
optimal loan(2) given states(G,L,S)
0 100 200 300 400
0
1
2
3
optimal loan(3) given states(G,L,S)
0 100 200 300 400
0
5
10
15
total loan given states(G,L,S)
0 100 200 300 400
0
5
10
optimal loan(1) given states(B,L,S)
0 100 200 300 400
0
1
2
optimal loan(2) given states(B,L,S)
0 100 200 300 400
0
0.5
1
1.5
optimal loan(3) given states(B,L,S)
0 100 200 300 400
0
5
10
total loan given states(B,L,S)
Fig. 11. Optimal Loan Portfolio Choice(2) of Productivity Shock Situation
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Fig. 12. Optimal Loan Portfolio Choice(3) of Productivity Shock Situation
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Fig. 13. Optimal Deposit Interest Rate of Productivity Shock Situation
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Fig. 14. Optimal Deposit Amount of Productivity Shock Situation
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Fig. 15. Optimal Liquidation Policy of Productivity Shock Situation
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Fig. 16. Total Output of Productivity Shock Situation
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Fig. 17. Bank Revenue of Productivity Shock Situation
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Fig. 18. Optimal Loan Portfolio Choice(1) of Liquidity Shock Situation
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Fig. 19. Optimal Loan Portfolio Choice(2) of Liquidity Shock Situation
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Fig. 20. Optimal Loan Portfolio Choice(3) of Liquidity Shock Situation
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Fig. 21. Optimal Deposit Interest Rate of Liquidity Shock Situation
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Fig. 22. Optimal Deposit Amount of Liquidity Shock Situation
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Fig. 23. Optimal Liquidation Policy of Liquidity Shock Situation
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Fig. 24. Total Output of Liquidity Shock Situation
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Fig. 25. Bank Revenue of Liquidity Shock Situation
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